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1. Introduction
Modern behavioral theories developed to simulate markets typically employ models of agents that 
exhibit some aspects of human behavior. By so doing, they provide insight into phenomena that are 
not explained by classical theories. However, the assumptions underlying agents’ behavior do not 
always reflect results of psychological studies. There are a number of examples of this.
Harras and Sornette (2011) constructed a market model, in which agents choose at each time 
step whether to trade or not. Traders in their model use information from three sources: private in-
formation, public information, and the expected decisions of other traders. However, their model 
does not take into account news valence, even though the importance that people attribute to infor-
mation depends on its valence (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and does not allow for differences in the 
way people react to verbal news and graphically presented price series (Andreassen, 1990).
Kuzmina’s (2010) model consisted of three types of agents: rational investors, noise investors, and 
emotional investors. The agents differed in the way they reacted to news. Kuzmina assumed that all 
market participants submit their trades simultaneously. However, Odean (1998) shows that the tim-
ing of buy/sell decision is highly variable.
Anufriev and Panchenko (2009) modeled a market with fundamentalists and trend-following 
agents, assuming that all agents were risk averse. However, though psychological studies have 
shown that some people are risk seeking rather than risk-averse (Cheung & Mikels, 2011; Nicholson, 
Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005), Anufriev and Panchenko (2009) did not take such indi-
vidual differences into account.
To some extent, mismatches between models and data reflect the simplifications necessary to 
ensure that mathematical manipulation of the equations within the models is tractable (De Grauwe, 
2010). Inappropriate assumptions may also reflect lack of communication between those working 
within behavioral finance and psychology. However, financial modelers could also point out that the 
psychological literature typically supplies disconnected principles for human behavior that are not 
always easy to apply to trading environments. Therefore, there is a need to provide those who are 
developing agent-based simulations of market behavior with behavioral principles that are more 
specifically relevant to their concerns.
Here we are concerned with three main issues: the way people, who employ technical analysis 
methods (e.g. a proportion of retail investors), incorporate news and graphically presented price 
series into their financial decisions, the time they take to make those decisions, and the effect of 
individual differences on their decisions. These three issues are all relevant to assumptions included, 
explicitly or implicitly, in behavioral models of the market of the sort described above. They are also 
germane to assumptions that are included in classical models of market behavior. For example, the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) requires that news is incorporated into asset prices immediately 
and in an unbiased manner. Incorporation of news should, therefore, be independent of individual 
differences (Findlay & Williams, 2000).
2. Literature review
2.1. The effect of news on financial decisions
Different versions of the EMH define the scope of the information to be included in prices. This infor-
mation varies from the previous price series (the weak version) through all publicly available infor-
mation (the semi-strong version) to all information (the strong version). The semi-strong and strong 
versions of the EMH therefore assert that news cannot be used by investors in order to make profit 
(Findlay & Williams, 2000). Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that news has a large effect on invest-
ment decisions and price series (Barber & Odean, 2008; Cecchini, Aytug, Koehler, & Pathak, 2010; 
Engelberg & Parsons, 2011; Hayo & Neuenkirch, 2012; Reeves & Sawicki, 2007; Tetlock, 2007).
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How do people respond to news? Caginalp, Porter, and Hao (2010) have produced evidence imply-
ing that people underreact to news when valuing asset prices. However, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
argued on the basis of their analysis of winner and loser portfolios that they overreact to news. 
Moreover, Tuckett (2012) has shown that investors construct narratives in order to give their world 
meaning and to enable them to function under conditions of extreme uncertainty. Thus, people may 
attribute high importance to news because news items are the narratives of the financial world: they 
describe, or at least give the illusion, of causality, whereas price graphs that appear largely random 
may not offer the same degree of psychological comfort. We therefore hypothesize that, when pro-
vided with both types of information, people will choose to base their trading strategy on news more 
than they do on price graphs (H1).
Andreassen (1990) used experiments to study the conditions under which overreaction to news 
occurred, and, in particular, the effect of contradiction between news items and stock price trends 
on financial decisions. He presented his participants with 60 experimental trials, each consisting of 
a display of the current price of a stock, the price change from the previous trial, and a news item 
about the stock. Participants were instructed to “buy shares for less than you sell them” and “sell 
them before they do down.” There were three experimental conditions. In the first condition, partici-
pants saw no news; in the second, they saw “normal” news; in the third, they saw “reversed news.” 
“Normal” news items were positive when price trend was positive and negative when price trend 
was negative. The valence of “reversed” news was opposite to the sign of the price series trend. 
Trends in the series were manipulated as well. The main dependent variable was participants’ “track-
ing”, measured by the correlation between the number of shares held at the end of each trial and 
the concurrent price. Andreassen (1990) found that tracking was the highest in the reverse-news 
and no news conditions, and weakest in the normal news condition.
Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) performed a large-scale survey to examine the views that foreign 
exchange traders hold on news available to market participants. In line with the results of Andreassen 
(1990), they found that news items that were consistent with market expectations were considered 
less important than those that were inconsistent with them. Hence, we hypothesize that partici-
pants will track prices more and show more active trading (buying or selling rather than holding their 
assets) in non-contradicting conditions than in contradicting ones (H2).
Andreassen (1990) did not examine the effect of each of the four possible combinations of news 
valence and price trend separately. Considering only contradicting versus non-contradicting results 
masks any effects of news valence. However, we know that people react to good and bad news in an 
asymmetric way. For instance, Galati and Ho (2003) found that people tend to ignore good news but 
react to bad news. Hence, on the basis of their results, we hypothesized that, when short-selling is 
not possible, people will sell more assets when the news is bad than they will buy when it is good 
(H3).
2.2. The timing of financial decisions
The second assumption of the EMH deals with trading latencies of market participants. Nearly all 
behavioral models have to make some assumptions about agents’ trading latencies (e.g. Kuzmina, 
2010).
The psychological basis for the timing of financial decisions has not been subject to intensive in-
vestigation. However, Lee and Andrade (2011) found that participants in whom they had induced a 
sense of fear tended to sell stocks earlier than participants in the control condition. They chose to 
manipulate fear because it is increased by risk and uncertainty. Their results therefore imply that 
financial risk and uncertainty reduce trading latency.
In our task, trading latency was defined as the number of data points that participants saw before 
they made a buy/sell decision. In those cases in which participants chose to hold their shares until the 
end of the series, trading latency was defined as the maximum number of series points.1 On the basis 
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of Lee and Andrade’s (2011) findings, we hypothesize that trading latency will be shorter when uncer-
tainty is higher, that is, when there is an inconsistency between news valence and price trends (H4). 
Also, if we are correct in hypothesizing that people rely more on news than on price trend data when 
making financial decisions, then we would expect that the effect of news on trading latencies will be 
stronger than that of the price trend, and that trading latency will be shorter when news is bad (H5).
2.3. Individual differences: Effects of culture
The EMH assumption that traders are rational requires homogeneous trader groups. However, this 
assumption does not hold. Ackert, Church, and Zhang (2002) conducted experimental markets in the 
US, Canada, and China in order to examine the effect of imperfect private information on informa-
tion dissemination. In their markets, traders were given information about period-end dividend. The 
researchers manipulated the accuracy level of the information given to traders. They defined degree 
of information dissemination as the movement in transaction price towards the price given to well-
informed agents. They found that degree of information dissemination depended on the accuracy of 
the given information and on participants’ nationality. When accuracy of information was 90%, 
news dissemination was greater in the USA and Canada than in China. However, when information 
accuracy was 75%, it was higher in China than in Canada and similar to that observed in the USA.
Inaccurate or misleading information can be represented by a mismatch between news items and 
price graph trend. In line with the findings of Ackert et al. (2002), we hypothesize that participants 
from Western culture will react to news more than participants from Eastern countries in consistent 
conditions (good news with positive price trend or bad news with negative trend) but that partici-
pants from Eastern Asian countries will react to news more than participants from Western coun-
tries in inconsistent conditions (good news with negative trend or bad news with positive trend) (H6).
Nisbett (2003) has carried out a program of work that indicates that people in Eastern cultures 
think more holistically and less analytically than those in Western ones. They make greater attempts 
to pull all available evidence into a single holistic framework. Consequently, we should expect them 
to require more time to produce a narrative that meets their adequacy criteria. If trading requires 
development of such narratives, they should exhibit longer trading latencies (H7a) that would, in turn, 
result in higher degrees of dispersion in their returns (H7b).
2.4. Individual differences: Effects of personality
Only Durand, Newby, and Sanghani (2008) and Durand, Newby, Peggs, and Siekierka (2013) have 
systematically studied how trading decisions are affected by the big five personality traits (McCrae 
& Costa, 1987; Norman, 1963). These traits comprise extraversion; negative emotion, such as anxi-
ety; openness to experience; agreeableness; conscientiousness. Based on results from their investor 
survey, Durand et al. (2008) argued that people with different personalities are attracted to different 
types of security: for example, those who were more extraverted had a greater preference for inno-
vation. Based on results from their trading experiment, Durand et al. (2013) went on to argue that 
personality influences not only what people trade in but also how they trade. For example, people 
more open to experience developed more diversified portfolios.
Our trading task is simpler than the one used by Durand et al. (2013). Participants were not re-
quired to form portfolios of investments. They merely had to decide whether to sell, hold, or buy a 
series of 12 assets. We ask whether personality influences performance even in this basic trading 
task. From our sense-making perspective, we expected that it will do.
We know that people more open to experience have shorter reaction times in a variety of (non-
financial) tasks (Fiori & Antonakis, 2012). This is probably because those who are more open to ex-
perience have a great need for cognition (Sadowski & Cogburn, 1997). People with higher need for 
cognition put more cognitive effort into tasks and hence process the information they are given 
more selectively and effectively (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). This implies that people more open 
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to experience will put more effort into making sense of trading-related information and succeed in 
doing so sooner. As a result, they will have shorter trading latencies (H8). Faster trading may, in turn, 
influence share buying and resulting returns.
3. Experiment 1
To address our two main aims, we designed Experiment 1 to determine the effects that news va-
lence and trend have on financial decisions and trading latencies in participants from different cul-
tures and with different personalities. As we have seen, all these factors have a role in various 
behavioral models of the market and are relevant to the assumptions underlying many behavioral 
models. Furthermore, presenting participants with both price graphs and news items can yield direct 
evidence about the validity of the assumptions of the EMH.
To test hypotheses H1 to H8, we presented participants with a sequence of 12 graphs of real finan-
cial asset prices. Participants were told that they would be initially endowed with one share of each 
of the assets and a virtual sum of money large enough to buy one additional share of each of those 
assets.
Graphs of each asset were updated gradually so that a new point was added to the graphs every 
0.02 seconds. There were 10 blocks of 20 points. After each block, participants were asked to decide 
whether to buy, sell, or hold their asset. After every other block (i.e. after the 40th point, the 80th 
point, and so on), participants were presented with a news item. The direction of the trends in the 
price graphs and valence of news were manipulated to form a two (positive versus negative trend) 
by two (good versus bad news) within-participant design. U-shaped and inverse U-shaped graphs 
were added as fillers to mask the rationale of the experiment.
We recorded the number of shares participants had in each of the experimental conditions after 
deciding to buy another share of each asset, sell they share, or hold their share. We refer to this vari-
able as the final share number. We also recorded the number of points that were displayed before 
decisions to buy or sell were made. We refer to this as decision latency.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Sixty people (28 men and 32 women) acted as participants. Number of participants was selected 
according to Maxwell’s (2004) advice to ensure that the sample size was adequate to achieve ac-
ceptable statistical power. All of them were recruited through a participant recruitment website at 
University College London. University College London is a highly international university. For in-
stance, according to the University’s student and registry services (https://www.ucl.ac.uk/srs/statis-
tics), in 2013–2014, there was a total of 601 Chinese students, as well as 10,400 students classified 
as “white.” This demographical composition enabled us to recruit participants of both Eastern and 
Western origins.
The majority of the participants had an undergraduate degree or above and came from a wide 
range of occupational backgrounds. We were interested in examining the behavior of lay people 
because the Internet has greatly facilitated non-professional trading (Barber & Odean, 2008; 
Muradoğlu & Harvey, 2012). In addition, studies contrasting the financial behavior of lay people and 
experts have rarely found differences between them (Muradoğlu & Önkal, 1994; Zaleskiewicz, 2011). 
Participants’ average age was 25.11 years (SD: 10.02). Participants from Western and Eastern cul-
tures were recruited separately to ensure that there were equal numbers in the two groups.
The Western group comprised thirty people (17 men and 13 women) with an average age of 
28.89 years. Among their countries of origin were: USA, UK, Romania, Italy, Lithuania, and Russia. 
Twenty-one of the Western participants were undergraduate or postgraduate students.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
09
.15
0.1
43
.73
] a
t 0
3:1
1 2
7 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
Page 6 of 21
Sobolev et al., Cogent Economics & Finance (2017), 5: 1295618
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2017.1295618
The Eastern group comprised thirty people (11 men and 19 women) with an average age of 
21.47 years. Among their countries of origin were: Hong Kong, China, and Singapore. Twenty-six of 
the Eastern participants were undergraduate or postgraduate students.
All participants had spent most of their lives in their country of origin and none were of mixed 
parentage.
All participants were paid a fixed fee of £2. An additional £2 was available as  performance-related 
pay: if the value of a participant’s portfolio at the end of the experiment was at least £15 more than 
its initial value, an additional £1 was paid; if the value of that portfolio was at least £30 more than 
its initial value, an additional £2 was paid.
3.1.2. Stimulus materials
Eighteen price series of financial assets were downloaded from Yahoo! Finance (http://finance.ya-
hoo.com/). Financial assets consisted of stocks of well-known companies, including Ford, Walt 
Disney, and IBM. Each series consisted of 2,500 close prices of financial assets. To avoid confounding 
variables, we chose six time series with a Hurst exponent that was close to a constant and in the 
interval [0.500, 0.556]2. (The Hurst exponent of time series is correlated with variables such as the 
series oscillation, variance and autocorrelation). We then chose 40 subsets of 220 consecutive ele-
ments from the original series. Each group of 10 subsets had a positive average trend, a negative 
average trend, a U-shape, or an inverse U-shape. The criterion for selection as a U-shape or inverse 
U-shape subsets was that the first and last points were not different by more than half a point. We 
then reflected subsets with negative and positive average trends about day 110 to create 10 more 
subsets of positive and negative trends, respectively. U-shaped and inverse U-shaped subsets were 
reflected about the time axis. Finally, all 80 resultant series were normalized to fit the same price 
range of [£2, £10]. This procedure for the construction of the series ensured that the average trend 
of the graphs in the positive and negative trend sets was the same.
Presented news items were based on real items, published on BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/) 
and Yahoo! Finance (http://finance.yahoo.com/). News was of two types, good and bad. Each news 
item was formulated as a single sentence that referred to a single company. A total of 30 news items 
evaluated as good were downloaded. Evaluation of the news items’ valence was based on the po-
tential of the news to increase the company’s value. Bad news was generated from the good news 
by inverting its meaning. For instance, in order to generate a bad news item from the good news 
item “Company awarded $115 Million in Patent-Infringement lawsuit,” we transformed it into 
“Company asked to pay $115 Million in Patent-Infringement lawsuit.” Appendix A provides addi-
tional examples of news items that we used.
Participants’ personality traits were assessed using the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), a 
standardized personality questionnaire (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). The TIPI measures the 
Big-Five personality traits: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional stability, and 
Openness to experience. Each personality trait is assessed according to the extent to which partici-
pants agree with two statements. For instance, Emotional stability is measured using the state-
ments “I see myself as anxious, easily upset” and “I see myself as calm, emotionally stable.” 
Openness to experience is assessed using the statements “I see myself as open to new experiences, 
complex” and “I see myself as conventional, uncreative.”
3.1.3. Design
Twelve graphs were chosen at random for each participant, four from the positive trend group, four 
from the negative trend group, two from the U-shaped group, and two from the inverse U-shaped 
group. Five news items, which were either all good or all bad, were chosen and randomly assigned 
to each graph to appear after points 40, 80, 120, 160, and 200. News items were sampled without 
repetition, so that each news item was viewed by each participant only once. Two of the graphs with 
the positive trend were assigned to good news sets and two of them to bad news sets. Similar 
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choices were made for the graphs with the negative trend, resulting in a two (positive or negative 
trend) by two (good or bad news valence) design. Every condition was tested using two graphs per 
participant.
The purpose of the U-shaped series and inverse U-shaped series was to mask the manipulations, 
and so participants’ results in these conditions were not analyzed. However, each of them was also 
paired with either good or bad news group. The graphs were not labeled with asset names to ensure 
that the participants could not use prior knowledge about the assets.
Graphs and news were presented using a graphic user interface program written in Matlab. 
Figure 1 shows a typical task window from the experiment.
3.1.4. Procedure
The experiment comprised three stages. First, in a familiarization task, participants were asked to 
make financial decisions with respect to three practice graphs. Results of familiarization task were 
not included in the analysis. Second, they were asked to make financial decisions with respect to the 
randomly chosen 12 experimental graphs. Third, they were asked to complete the TIPI question-
naire (Gosling et al., 2003).
Participants were endowed with a virtual sum of money and one share of each of the 12 different 
assets. They were instructed to increase the total value of their portfolio above its initial value as 
much as possible. Participants were also told that they would be presented with the price graphs of 
each of these assets, one at a time. Prices were updated at a rate of one point per 0.2 seconds. The 
total value of the portfolio and each of the assets was updated after every point as well. These val-
ues were presented to the participants in a table. Additional instructions informed them that, after 
every 20 points, they would be asked to decide whether to (1) buy another share of the asset, result-
ing in them having another share of the stock but less money to buy more stocks, (2) sell their share 
of the asset, resulting in them having no shares in it but more money, or (3) hold their share of the 
asset. Short selling was not an available option in the setting of the experiment. They were informed 
that, if they decided to buy or sell, they would then move on to consider the next asset. However, if 
they decided to hold, the price graph of the current asset would continue to be updated in real time 
until they were asked to make another decision about it at the next decision point. The final contri-
bution of each of the assets to the portfolio was determined according to its price when participants 
made a buy or sell decision, or the price at day 200 if participants decided to hold the asset on day 
200.
After every 40 price points, participants were presented with a piece of news that was related to 
the current asset, together with a message emphasizing that they should read it carefully.
Participants were also told that there might be a “Possible additional investment task” and that 
the experimenter may ask them to use their portfolio (money and assets left from the second stage 
of the experiment) for another investment task. The reason for this was that performing any ac-
tion—buying, selling, or holding an asset—did not change the total value of the portfolio. The total 
value of participants’ portfolio changed only as asset prices changed. Possible future use of assets 
chosen to be held or bought endowed these actions with financial meaning.
Participants were informed how their fees depended on their performance. However, they were 
not provided with any trading strategy of the type Andreassen (1990) used to instruct his 
participants.
At the end of the experiment, participants completed the TIPI questionnaire and were asked 
whether they identified any patterns in the data.
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3.2. Results
Results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Primary dependent variables were trading latency and final 
share number. Trading latency was measured by the number of data points participants saw before 
making the decision to buy or sell each asset, or the maximum number of presented points (200) if 
participants made their decision to buy, sell, or hold their asset after all point series had been pre-
sented on the graph. A final share number of zero indicated that participants had sold their share, 
one meant that participants chose to hold their share, and two showed that participants had chosen 
Figure 1. A typical task window 
from Experiment 1.
Note: The figure shows the 
non-conflicting condition with 
bad news and a negative trend.
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to buy an additional share. We also analyzed participant returns (defined as the difference between 
the asset price at decision time and at the time of initial presentation of the series).
3.2.1. The effect of news on financial decisions
To examine hypothesis H1, we carried out a four-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on final share 
number using culture (Western or Eastern) as a between-participant variable and trend (positive or 
negative), news valence (good or bad), and instance (first or second presentation of series in each 
condition) as within-participant variables. This revealed that final share number was larger when 
news was good (F (1, 29) = 29.35; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.50) and when trend was positive 
(F (1, 29) = 7.56; p = 0.01; partial η2 = 0.21). The size of effect of news valence was larger than that of 
the trend in the graphs, a finding that is consistent with hypothesis H1. There was also an interaction 
between group and trend (F (1, 29) = 5.40; p = 0.027; partial η2 = 0.157). Tests of simple effects 
showed that in Western participants, final share number was higher when the trend was positive 
(F (1, 29) = 11.27; p = 0.002; partial η2 = 0.28).
To examine hypothesis H2, we put participants’ results into two groups: the conflicting conditions 
(good news, negative trend and bad news, positive trend) and the non-conflicting conditions (good 
news, positive trend and bad news, negative trend). For each group, we extracted the deviation of 
the final share number from 1 (the “hold” option). ANOVA failed to yield a significant difference in 
this variable between the conflicting and non-conflicting conditions (p > 0.05). Next, following 
Andreassen (1990), we calculated participants’ price tracking (the correlation between the price of 
an asset at decision time with the final share number) for the conflicting and non-conflicting sets of 
results. An ANOVA showed neither an effect of culture nor of conflict between trend type and news 
type (p > 0.05). Hence, we failed to replicate Andreassen’s (1990) results: our data are not consistent 
with hypothesis H2.
Table 1. Results of Experiment 1
Notes: Panel A shows the results of the Western participant group, and Panel B shows the results of the Eastern 
participant group in Experiment 1. Data presented consists of trading latency (the number of data points that 
participants saw before they made a buy/sell decision, or the maximal number of points), Share number (the average 
number of shares participants had after making their decisions), and returns (the difference between the asset price 
at decision time and at the time of initial presentation of the series). The results are presented for each of the four 
experimental conditions separately.
Trend
Positive Negative
Panel A : Western group, N = 30
Trading latency News valence Good 48.33 (48.89) 60.00 (61.84)
Bad 45.67 (38.28) 36.67 (24.75)
Share number News valence Good 1.35 (0.92) 0.83 (0.96)
Bad 1.03 (1.01) 0.4 (0.81)
Returns News valence Good 3.14 (2.00) −3.31 (2.22)
Bad 2.12 (1.38) −2.68 (1.16)
Panel B: Eastern group, N = 30
Trading latency News valence Good 92.33 (71.98) 106.34 (70.78)
Bad 66.00 (55.27) 73.66 (61.45)
Share number News valence Good 1.13 (0.96) 1.15 (0.917)
Bad 0.72 (0.96) 0.60 (0.87)
Returns News valence Good 4.24 (2.25) −4.35 (2.25)
Bad 2.94 (1.89) −3.44 (2.02)
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To examine hypothesis H3, we grouped all participants’ results together, and extracted two new 
variables. The first one was the difference between final share number and 1 share (the result of a 
“hold” choice) when news was good. The second variable was the difference between 1 share and 
final share number when news was bad. These variables indicate the signed choice deviation from a 
“hold” decision. ANOVA revealed that when news was good people bought fewer shares (mean: 
0.12; SD: 0.95) than they sold when news was bad (mean: 0.31; SD: 0.95). This difference 
(F (1,479) = 5.16; p = 0.024) is consistent with hypothesis H3.
Table 2. Hypotheses and results of Experiment 1
Notes: This table summarizes the hypotheses examined in Experiment 1 and their results. NS represents insignificant results. The variable condition type had two 
values: contradiction condition or non-contradicting condition.
Hypothesis Variables in statistical analysis Results and conclusions
Dependent variable Independent variable
H1 : When provided with both types of 
information, people base their 
trading strategy on news more than 
they do on price graphs
Final Share number Culture, trend, news valence, 
instance
The effect of news valence on final 
share number (F (1, 29) = 29.35; 
p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.50) was 
larger than that of the trend (F (1, 
29) = 7.56; p = 0.01; partial η2 = 0.21) 
We accepted H1
H2: People track prices more and 
show more active trading (buying or 
selling rather than holding their 
assets) in non-contradicting 
conditions than in contradicting ones
Deviation of final share number from 
1, price tracking
Condition type (contradicting or 
non-contradicting)
NS
We rejected H2
H3: People sell more assets when the 
news is bad than they buy when it is 
good when short-selling is not 
possible
The difference between final share 
number and 1
News valence When news was good people bought 
fewer shares than they sold when 
news was bad (F (1,479) = 5.16; 
p = 0.024)
We accepted H3
H4: Trading latency is shorter when 
uncertainty is higher, that is, when 
there is an inconsistency between 
news valence and price trends
Trading latencies Condition type NS
We rejected H4
H5: The effect of news on trading 
latencies is stronger than that of the 
price trend, and trading latency is 
shorter when news is bad
Trading latency Culture, trend, news valence, 
instance
Trading latency was longer when 
news was good (F (1, 29) = 29.05; 
p < 0.01; partial η2 = 0.50) but the 
effect of trend was insignificant
We accepted H5
H6: Participants from Eastern Asian 
countries react to news more than 
participants from Western countries 
in inconsistent conditions 
Number of shares, trading latency 
and returns
Culture, condition type NS
We rejected H6
H7a: People from Eastern culture 
exhibit longer trading latencies
Trading latency Culture, trend, news valence, 
instance
Trading latency was shorter for 
Western participants (F (1, 
29) = 17.23; p < 0.01; partial 
η2 = 0.37)
We accepted H7a
H7b: Trading decisions of people from 
eastern countries result in higher 
degrees of dispersion in their returns
Return dispersion Culture Return dispersion in the Eastern 
group was larger than that of 
Western group (t (239) = 5.60; 
(p < 0.001)
We accepted H7b
H8 : People who are more open to 
experience have shorter trading 
latencies
Trading latencies Self rating of openness to experience Participants with greater openness to 
experience had lower trading 
latencies
We accepted H8
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3.2.2. The timing of financial decisions
To examine hypothesis H4, we performed a t-test to compare trading latencies in the conflicting and 
non-conflicting conditions. No difference was found (p > 0.05): our data are not consistent with 
hypothesis H4.
To examine hypothesis H5, we carried out a four-way ANOVA on trading latency with culture 
(Western or Eastern) as a between-participant variable and trend (positive or negative), news 
 valence (good or bad), and instance (first or second presentation of series in each condition) as 
within-participant variables. This showed that trading latency was longer when news was good 
(F (1, 29) = 29.05; p < 0.01; partial η2 = 0.50) but that the effect of trend was insignificant. This pattern 
of results is consistent with hypothesis H5.
3.2.3. Effects of culture
To investigate Hypothesis H6, we performed three separate two-way ANOVAs on number of shares, 
trading latency and returns, each with culture (Western or Eastern) as a between-participant varia-
ble and condition (non-conflicting or conflicting) as a within-participant variable. The ANOVAs re-
vealed that in no case was an interaction effect between culture and condition found (p > 0.05). We 
therefore reject hypothesis H6.
To examine hypothesis H7a, we carried out a four-way ANOVA on trading latency with culture as a 
between-participant variable and trend, news valence, and instance as within-participant variables. 
This showed that trading latency was shorter for Western participants (F (1, 29) = 17.23; p < 0.01; 
partial η2 = 0.37), a finding that is consistent with hypothesis H7a.
We performed a four-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on returns using the same variables as be-
fore. As expected, returns were larger when trends were positive (F (1, 29) = 417.32, p < 0.001; partial 
η2 = 0.94). Table 1 shows that return variances of participants from the Eastern group were higher than 
those of participants from the Western group. To compare these, we defined return dispersion as the 
absolute value of the difference between the return of each asset of each participant and the mean 
return in participant’s group. A t-test revealed that return dispersion in the Eastern group was larger 
than that of Western group (t (239) = 5.60; p < 0.001). These results are consistent with hypothesis H7b.
In addition, 18 of the Eastern participants gave a positive answer to the question “Did you find any 
pattern associated with the news?” and 12 of the Western participants did so. This difference was 
not significant (χ2 (1) = 1.20; NS).
3.2.4. Effects of personality
For each of the participants and for each of the experimental conditions (good or bad news, positive 
or negative trend), we extracted the mean trading latency, mean final share number and mean re-
turns. Participants with greater openness to experience had lower trading latencies (r = −0.28; 
p = 0.033 when news was good and the trend was positive; r = −0.32; p = 0.014 when news was good 
and the trend was negative; r = −0.368; p = 0.004 when news was bad and the trend was positive; 
r = −0.331; p = 0.011 when news was bad and the trend was negative). They also bought more shares 
but only when bad news was combined with a positive trend in the price data (r = 0.36; p = 0.005). 
Finally, their returns were higher when the trend in the price data was negative (r = 0.34; p = 0.008 
for good news; r = 0.31; p = 0.016 for bad news) but lower when it was positive and the news was bad 
(r = −0.27; p = 0.038). These results are consistent with hypothesis H8. Correlations between remain-
ing four personality traits and the task variables were not statistically significant.
3.2.5. Effects of possible confounding variables
We did not match the age or gender of participants in the Western and Eastern groups precisely. 
However, these variables had no significant effects on trading latency or return dispersion and so 
cannot provide an alternative account for the differences observed between the two groups. 
Furthermore, analyses showed that there were no learning (or fatigue) effects.
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3.3. Discussion
Participants made faster decisions (H5) and bought fewer shares when news was bad than when it 
was good. They also sold more shares when the news was bad than they bought when it was good 
(H3). In addition, participants bought more shares when the trend in the price data was positive but 
this effect was weaker than that of the news valence (H1).
Why was the effect of news valence on share number stronger than that of the trend in the price 
graphs? Though participants were instructed to pay attention to the news items, their presentation 
was no more visually salient than that of the trend in the price series (Figure 1). Furthermore, port-
folio values were continuously updated in a manner that matched the price changes in the graph. 
Participants could, therefore, see that their losses (or gains) corresponded directly to changes in the 
price series rather than to the news items. Hence, we interpret the greater influence of news on trad-
ing in light of Tuckett’s (2012) arguments that people need to find meaning in their environment. 
News offers narratives and therefore people tend to focus on it.
None of the hypotheses (H2, H4, H6) based on putative effects of a conflict between news and price 
data were supported. Although share buying was affected both by news and by price trend, effects 
of these variables did not interact in the manner expected on the basis of conflict effects.
Participants in the Eastern group made their trades much later than those in the Western one, 
and, as a result, their return dispersions were larger (H7). This finding is consistent with the notion 
that they developed more complex narratives that pulled together the different pieces of informa-
tion they had encountered into a more holistic framework (Nisbett, 2003).
Our finding that participants with greater openness to experience had shorter trading latencies is 
consistent with results obtained by Fiori and Antonakis (2012) in a variety of non-financial tasks. 
However, from a risk taking perspective, it is perhaps surprising. Nicholson et al. (2005) found that 
propensity to take risks was greater in extraverts and in those who are more open to experience. As 
shorter trading latencies indicate lower risk propensity, their findings would lead us to expect longer 
rather than shorter decision latencies in those with high levels of openness to experience. Hence, it 
appears unlikely that the relation between trading latency and openness to experience was medi-
ated by risk propensity. Instead, it is more likely that people open to experience put more cognitive 
effort into their task and thereby made more effective use of the information they received. As a 
result, they were able to produce a satisfactory narrative for it sooner.
4. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to further our understanding of the processes that guide trading deci-
sions. In their survey, Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) found that foreign exchange traders attrib-
uted high relevance to news items which were perceived as being able to influence the market. Thus, 
in our task, we expect a positive correlation between views about the extent to which an event 
would affect prices and final share number (H9).
Despite a large literature on judgmental forecasting (Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor, & Önkal, 
2006), Harvey’s (2010) study appears to be the only one that has established a connection between 
financial forecasts and decisions—and those were managerial rather than financial decisions. 
Andreassen (1990) merely conjectured that forecasts mediate between data and decisions. Given 
that Experiment 1 demonstrated that decisions are influenced both by news and by price data, such 
mediation implies that forecasts should also be affected by these variables. In particular, the differ-
ence between a participant’s forecast and the last data point should depend on the news valence 
and the direction of the trend in the price data (H10). Furthermore, there should be a positive correla-
tion between that difference and final share number (H11).
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Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1. However, to examine Hypothesis H9, participants were 
asked to rate the plausibility that presented news could affect the price of each asset. Additionally, 
to investigate Hypotheses H10–H11, they were asked to make forecasts after every 20-point block.
Experiment 2 also provided an opportunity for confirming our conclusions pertaining to hypothe-
ses H1–H5.
4.1. Method
In addition to making trading decisions, this experiment required participants to make forecasts and 
to assess how plausible it was that each news event would affect asset prices.
4.1.1. Participants
Thirty people (11 men and 19 women) recruited in the same way as before acted as participants. 
Again, number of participants was selected according to Maxwell’s (2004) advice to ensure that the 
sample size was appropriate for achieving acceptable statistical power. All participants were from 
Western culture (among their countries of origin were: USA, Canada, Finland, Italy, UK, Ireland, 
Germany, and Spain) and their average age was 25.23 years (SD: 6.99). Twenty-eight of them were 
undergraduate or postgraduate students. They were paid a fixed fee of £2. Up to an additional £2 
was paid according to their performance in the same way as in Experiment 1.
4.1.2. Materials and design
These were the same as in Experiment 1. In particular, we used the price graphs of financial assets 
and news items as described in Section 3.1.2 Each participant was presented with 12 graphs, chosen 
at random as described in Section 3.1.3.
4.1.3. Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, except that participants were presented with a news 
item every 40 points starting from point 20 (rather than every 40 points starting from point 40). This 
was to ensure that all participants, including those who decided to buy or sell their assets after 20 
points, saw at least one news item.
In addition, after every 20 points, participants were asked, before making their decision, to make 
a single forecast for the point that was 20 points ahead of the current one. Forecasts were made by 
clicking the mouse on a vertical line designating the required forecast date. Until participants 
pressed the button “save forecast,” they could edit their forecast by clicking the mouse again on the 
line. Moreover, whenever a news item was presented, participants were asked to rate how plausible 
it was that such a news event would affect asset prices. Plausibility ratings were performed using a 
slider and they ranged between zero and 100, where 0 meant “not plausible at all,” and 100 meant 
“extremely plausible.” Figure 2 presents a typical task window in Experiment 2.
4.2. Results
Results are shown in Tables 3 and 4. In addition to analyzing the data as before, we extracted partici-
pants’ plausibility ratings and forecasts. (One forecast of one of the participants in the condition bad 
news, negative average trend was removed because it was more than four standard deviations from 
the mean of the forecasts in that condition).
4.2.1. The effect of news on financial decisions
A three-way ANOVA, using trend (positive or negative), news valence (good or bad), and instance 
(first or second presentation of series in each condition) as within-participant variables, showed that 
final share number was higher when news was good (F (1, 29) = 11.47; p = 0.002; partial η2 = 0.28) 
and when price graphs had a positive trend (F (1, 29) = 4.54; p = 0.042; partial η2 = 0.14). These re-
sults are consistent with hypothesis H1 and replicate those obtained in Experiment 1.
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As before, we classified trials into those in which the news valence and price trend were conflicting 
and non-conflicting. ANOVAs comparing the final number of shares and the deviation of final num-
ber of shares from 1 (“hold” decision) failed to find any significant effect of conflict (p > 0.05). Thus, 
as in Experiment I, we reject Hypothesis H2.
Figure 2. A typical task window 
from Experiment 2.
Note: The figure shows the 
conflicting condition with bad 
news and a positive trend.
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To test hypothesis H3, we proceeded in the same way as before. The ANOVA revealed an asym-
metry in final share number with respect to news and trend (F (1, 119) = 11.62; p = 0.001). Participants 
sold more shares when news was bad and the trend in the price data negative than they bought 
when news was good and the trend in the price data was positive. Similar results were obtained 
when we compared deviation from “hold” option for good news and bad news (F (1, 239) = 24.20; 
p < 0.001). As in Experiment I, our results are consistent with hypothesis H3.
4.2.2. The timing of financial decisions
An ANOVA comparing differences between trading latencies in conflicting and non-conflicting con-
ditions failed to reveal any effects of conflict (p > 0.05). Thus, as in Experiment I, our data do not 
support hypothesis H4.
A three-way ANOVA using trend, news valence, and instance as within-participant variables showed 
that trading latency was longer when the news was good (F (1,29) = 8.23; p = 0.008; partial η2 = 0.22). 
As no main effect of trend was obtained, our results are again consistent with hypothesis H5.
There was an interaction between news and trend (F (1, 29) = 5.68; p = 0.024; partial η2 = 0.16). 
Tests of simple effects showed that, when the trend was negative, trading latency was longer in the 
good news condition (F (1, 29) = 14.27; p = 0.001; partial η2 = 0.33) and that, when the news was bad, 
trading latency was longer when the trend was positive (F (1, 29) = 11.44; p = 0.002; partial η2 = 0.28). 
Further analysis showed that trading latency was longer when the news was good and the trend 
positive than when the news was bad and the trend negative (t (59) = 3.43; p = 0.001).
4.2.3. Plausibility ratings
A three-way ANOVA on plausibility estimates using the same three variables as before failed to find 
any significant effects (p > 0.05). Thus, our data failed to support Hypothesis H9.
4.2.4. Dependence of forecasts on news valence and trends in price data
Participants could produce up to 10 forecasts for each asset. For each time, t, at which participants 
made a decision regarding an asset, we extracted the differences between their forecasts for the 
price of the asset at time t + 20 and the price of the asset at time t. We then averaged these differ-
ences for each graph. An ANOVA, using the variables trend (positive or negative), news valence 
Table 3. Results of Experiment 2
Notes: This table shows averages of the results of Experiment 2. Data presented consists of trading latency (the number 
of data points that participants saw before they made a buy/sell decision, or the maximal number of points), Share number 
(the average number of shares participants had after making their decisions), Plausibility ratings (participants’ rating of 
the plausibility that presented news could affect the price of each asset), forecasts (the difference between participants’ 
forecasts and the last data point), and returns (the difference between the asset price at decision time and at the time of 
initial presentation of the series). The results are presented for each of the four experimental conditions separately.
Western participants (N = 30) Trend
Positive Negative
Trading latency News valence Good 75.00 (58.87) 69.00 (60.78)
Bad 67.33 (55.11) 45.00 (38.90)
Share number News valence Good 1.15 (0.97) 0.85 (0.95)
Bad 0.55 (0.87) 0.31 (0.72)
Plausibility News valence Good 0.67 (0.16) 0.65 (0.17)
Bad 0.65 (0.18) 0.68 (0.17)
Forecasts News valence Good 0.76 (0.66) 0.69 (1.05)
Bad −0.08 (0.94) −0.49 (1.07)
Returns News valence Good 2.20 (1.29) −2.23 (1.36)
Bad 1.57 (1.23) −1.59 (0.91)
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(good or bad), and instance (first or second presentation of series in each condition), showed that 
the difference between forecasts and asset prices was higher when news was good (F (1, 29) = 38.93; 
p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.57), and when the trend was positive (F (1, 29) = 14.76; p = 0.001; partial 
η2 = 0.34). These results provide support hypothesis H10.
4.2.5. Correlation between forecasts and financial decisions
To examine Hypothesis H11, we calculated the correlation of the number of shares participants had 
at the end of each trial with the difference between participants’ forecasts at the time of their final 
Table 4. Hypotheses and results of Experiment 2
Notes: This table summarizes the hypotheses examined in Experiment 2 and their results. NS represents insignificant results. The variable condition type had two 
values: contradiction condition or non-contradicting condition.
Hypothesis Variables in statistical analysis Results and conclusions
Dependent variable Independent variable
H1 : When provided with both types of 
information, people base their 
trading strategy on news more than 
they do on price graphs
Final Share number Trend, news valence, instance The effect of news on final share 
number (F (1, 29) = 11.47; p = 0.002; 
partial η2 = 0.28) was larger than the 
effect of trend (F (1, 29) = 4.54; 
p = 0.042; partial η2 = 0.14)
We accepted H1
H2: People track prices more and 
show more active trading (buying or 
selling rather than holding their 
assets) in non-contradicting 
conditions than in contradicting ones
Deviation of final share number from 
1, final number of shares
Condition type (contradicting or 
non-contradicting)
NS
We rejected H2
H3: People sell more assets when the 
news is bad than they buy when it is 
good when short-selling is not 
possible
The difference between final share 
number and 1
News valence Participants sold more shares when 
news was bad and the trend in the 
price data negative than they bought 
when news was good and the trend 
in the price data was positive (F (1, 
239) = 24.20; p < 0.001)
We accepted H3.
H4: Trading latency is shorter when 
uncertainty is higher, that is, when 
there is an inconsistency between 
news valence and price trends
Trading latencies Condition type NS
We rejected H4
H5: The effect of news on trading 
latencies is stronger than that of the 
price trend, and trading latency is 
shorter when news is bad
Trading latency Trend, news valence, instance Trading latency was longer when the 
news was good (F (1, 29) = 8.23; 
p = 0.008; partial η2 = 0.22). No main 
effect of trend was obtained
We accepted H5
H9: There is a positive correlation 
between views about the extent to 
which an event would affect prices 
and final share number
Plausibility estimates Trend, news valence, instance NS
We rejected H9
H10: The difference between a 
participant’s forecast and the last 
data point depends on the news 
valence and the direction of the trend 
in the price data
The difference between forecasts 
and asset prices
Trend, news valence, instance The difference between forecasts and 
asset prices was higher when news 
was good (F (1, 29) = 38.93; 
p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.57), and 
when the trend was positive (F (1, 
29) = 14.76; p = 0.001; partial 
η2 = 0.34)
We accepted H10
H11: There is a positive correlation 
between the difference between a 
participant’s forecast and the last 
data point, and the final share 
number 
Final share number The difference between a partici-
pant’s forecast and the last data 
point
There were positive correlations 
when the trends were positive, 
whether the news items were good 
(r = 0.53; p < 0.001) or bad (r = 0.48; 
p < 0.001)
We accepted H11
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trading decisions and the value of the last price they saw. A positive correlation between these two 
variables shows that participants tended to buy more shares when they thought that the prices 
would rise. Calculated for each condition separately, we found positive correlations when the trends 
were positive, whether the news items were good (r = 0.53; p < 0.001) or bad (r = 0.48; p < 0.001). No 
significant correlations were obtained for conditions with negative trends (p > 0.05). These results 
suggest that forecasts mediated between the data and trading decisions only when prices were ris-
ing. Thus, our results partially support hypothesis H11.
4.2.6. Effects of possible confounding variables
Analysis showed that participants’ gender had no significant effects on trading latency, returns or 
forecasts.
4.3. Discussion
Just as in Experiment 1, results were consistent with hypotheses H1, H3, and H5 but not with H2 and 
H4. Thus, our findings here give us additional confidence in the conclusions that we drew from that 
earlier experiment.
Experiment 2 supported Andreassen’s (1990) claim that forecasts mediate between data and de-
cisions. Forecasts depended strongly on news valence. Their dependence on the trends in the price 
series was weaker. Yet many experiments have shown that, in the absence of any news, forecasts 
depend strongly on the trends in data series (e.g. Harvey & Reimers, 2013; Lawrence et al., 2006). It 
appears that the presence of news dominates information relating to the trend in the price series: as 
we argued above, the appeal of the narrative structure of news is so strong that people prefer to act 
on it rather than on the trend cues.3
However, once forecasts had been made, their influence on trading was affected by the trend in 
the price series. When that trend was positive, forecasts were taken into account when making deci-
sions to buy or sell.
5. General discussion
During the past few years, a large body of research on agent-based market models has  accumulated. 
However, many market behavioral models include assumptions which are not based on psychologi-
cal findings. Our study has supplied data relevant to these models and cast new light on the way 
people react to financial data in trading tasks. Specifically, we chose to examine three factors that 
are relevant to EMH and frequently involved in modern financial models: the effect of news on finan-
cial decisions, trading latency, and individual differences between investors. Superficially, these 
three factors may appear to be diverse and unconnected. However, the effects related to them can 
all be accommodated within a single coherent approach.
Though our results are consistent with previous work on the inadequacy of the EMH (e.g. Findlay & 
Williams, 2000), they are best understood within a framework for understanding and modeling 
 trader behavior that takes into account the natural, human search for meaning.
First, though participants in our experiments could always see that the value of their portfolio 
changed according to the trend of the presented price graphs, most of them still chose to base their 
decisions on news items rather than on the price series. (If participants had insight into the experi-
mental manipulation, they would have based their decisions on the price graph more than on the 
news items). Trading latencies also depended on news rather than on the trend in price series. News 
provides narratives for those searching for meaning more easily than price trends do. In fact, news 
items may allow people to make sense of the price trends by supplying “cognitively comforting” 
causal interpretations of them in the way that Tuckett (2012) suggests. Causal interpretations within 
a narrative also underlie fundamental analysis and so this may also help to explain why many ana-
lysts prefer it over technical analysis.
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Second, openness to experience is correlated with need for cognition (Sadowski & Cogburn, 1997). 
Cacioppo et al. (1983) have shown that those with higher need for cognition put more cognitive ef-
fort into tasks and, as a result, are better able to focus their attention on the most relevant informa-
tion. This implies that people in our task who were more open to experience put more cognitive 
effort into selectively processing and integrating the information they received. As a result, they 
produced adequate narratives more quickly and were able to act on them sooner: they had shorter 
trading latencies.
Third, trading latencies of participants from Eastern cultures were much longer than those of 
Western participants. This difference resulted in a significantly higher dispersion of returns in the 
Eastern group. We know from the work of Nisbett and his colleagues (e.g. Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, 
Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) that those in Eastern cultures think more holistically and less analytically 
than those in Western ones. They make greater attempts to pull all available evidence into a single 
holistic framework. Narratives provide the primary means for bringing evidence into a coherent frame-
work (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Finding more coherent narratives requires additional processing. 
According to this line of reasoning, our Eastern participants had higher trading latencies because they 
spent more time make sensing of the evidence by generating more coherent narratives to explain it.
Fourth, forecasts may provide some insight into how participants selectively incorporated price 
trend information into their narratives. Forecasts were indeed higher when news was good and price 
trend was positive. Thus, even though forecasts were not optimal, they were in the right direction, a 
finding consistent with previous work (Harvey & Reimers, 2013). However, these forecasts influenced 
trading only when price trends were positive. Even though participants had forecast a drop in price 
when the price trend was down, they tended not to sell (c.f. Odean, 1998). One interpretation, de-
rived from one originally proposed by Lawrence and Makridakis (1989), is that people had contrast-
ing narratives for up trends and down trends. If prices were increasing, no agency would intervene 
to stop them from increasing and, hence, trades could be consistent with forecasts. However, if 
prices were forecast to decrease, there would be at least a possibility that some agency (e.g. the 
company owned by the shareholders) would intervene in an attempt to prevent any further de-
crease. As a consequence, it would be sensible not to act on or to delay acting on the forecast.
In summary, our findings shed light on previously reported, but not entirely understood, phenom-
ena. For instance, Odean (1998) found that traders tend to hold losing assets too long and sell them 
too early. He explained his result through tax considerations but we suggest that search for meaning 
may account for it. Traders attempt to make sense of information by incorporating it within a narra-
tive that provides a causal interpretation of events. Given research in other domains (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1993), it is likely that people select between different possible narratives by choosing the one 
that has the greatest degree of coherence. Other approaches, such as the EMH or behavioral models 
that incorporate a number of disconnected cognitive biases, do not appear to be capable of provid-
ing a satisfactory explanation for our findings.
5.1. Limitations
Participants in our experiments were not professional traders. We were interested in obtaining results 
from lay people as it has been shown that, over the last few years, a large number of lay people have 
started trading (Barber & Odean, 2008). In addition, it has been found that in many financial tasks, 
experts exhibit similar behavior to that of lay people (Muradoğlu & Önkal, 1994; Zaleskiewicz, 2011). 
Furthermore, the present results are consistent with those obtained from studies of professional trad-
ers (e.g. Odean, 1998). However, it would still be valuable to replicate them on populations of profes-
sional traders, retail investors and other market participants who use technical analysis methods.
We focused on one characteristic of news and price graphs: their valence or sign. However, both 
news and price graphs have other features that could be important (Nelson, Bloomfield, Hales, & 
Libby, 2001). For example, the degree of relevance of the news to the asset may affect financial deci-
sions and the volatility of price graphs may influence trading latency.
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In all of our experiments, participants were exposed to both graphical and verbal data. In future 
work, these could be studied separately. This would allow examination of the way that people per-
form in situations that require “pure” technical or “pure” fundamental analysis.
5.2. Summary
Our findings are not consistent with the assumptions underlying classical (EMH) or behavioral mod-
els of the market: news valence matters, timing of trading decisions is highly variable, and individual 
differences related to culture and personality affect the way that traders respond to news. However, 
our results are broadly consistent with a story model of trading that emphasizes investors’ search for 
meaning (e.g. Tuckett, 2012). In particular, they emphasize the importance of including realistic 
 assumptions about the effects of news on decisions, latency times, and individual differences in 
 financial models.
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Notes
1. The graphs that participants saw showed asset price as 
a function of time. Hence, trading latency represented 
the date on which participants made their financial 
decision in the virtual trading task rather than the actual 
duration of each trial.
2. This interval ensured that successive price changes 
were independent, thereby making series consistent 
with the random walk behavior expected from the EMH. 
This  allows our results to be compared with predictions 
derived from that approach.
3. Our inclusion of filler series with U-shaped and inverted 
U-shaped trends may have acted to reduce the weight 
that participants put on price trend data when making 
their trading decisions. However, inclusion of filler series 
ensured high external validity of the experiments: 
clearly, in real life, not all trends are easy to identify.
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Appendix A
Participants were presented with news items based on real news published on BBC (http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/) and Yahoo! Finance (http://finance.yahoo.com/). News items used in the experiments 
were classified as “good” if they could increase the value of the company. Examples of good news 
items included:
(1)  The company hits a 2-year high after new product release.
(2)  The company’s new product sales exceed predictions.
(3)  Analyst: “The company is in a good position.”
(4)  Company generates 4,000 new jobs.
(5)  Company enters Top 100 companies list.
(6)  Company announces 25% increase in quarterly dividend.
Bad news items were generated by changing the valence of the good news. The bad news items 
corresponding to the examples of good news items presented above were as follows:
(1)  The company hits a 2-year low after new product release.
(2)  The company’s new product sales failed to meet predictions.
(3)  Analyst: “The company is in a tough position.”
(4)  Company forced to cut 4,000 jobs.
(5)  Company loses place in Top 100 companies list.
(6)  Company announces 25% decrease in quarterly dividend.
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